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The International Criminal Court: The United States
Should Ratify the Rome Statute Despite Its Objections
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 17, 1998 the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC) opened the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court for signature by all States.' In short order the Rome
Statute boasted over one hundred signatories,2 and remained open for signature in New
York, at United Nations Headquarters, until December 31, 2000.3 The United States is
now a signatory of the Rome Statute; however, considering opposition to the Rome
Statute in the United States Congress,4 the prospects of ratification of the Rome Statute
are currently bleak. In refusing to sign the Rome Statute the United States stood in the
company of Iraq, China, Qatar, Sudan, Libya, and Israel. 5 One journalist even claimed
such a voting record demonstrated "a humiliating failure for the U.S. delegation[,J" and
that the United States joined with "such pariah states as Libya and Iraq."6 The United
States and Iraq may not share many goals in their foreign policy, but it may be true that
ironically, in their views of the ICC, Senator Jesse Helms of the United States and Sad-
dam Hussein of Iraq are of a similar mind - both want the future of international crimi-
nal law formed on their own terms.7
1. See U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.183/9 (1998)
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
Widespread attendance at the Conference was possible in part by a voluntary trust fund for travel assis-
tance. The fund "was important to facilitate the participation of those developing countries that were unable,
for financial reasons, to send their experts to Rome[.]" M2 Presswire, U.N.: Steps to Full Functioning Interna-
tional Court Discussed as Sixth Committee Considers Rome Statute, Oct. 23, 1998 (available at 1998 WL
16529473).
2. See U.N., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court - Ratifications, available at
<http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm (last updated Feb. 12 2001) [hereinafter Status of Rome Stat-
ute].
3. See id.
4. See American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2000, S. 2726, 106th Cong. §2; See also H.R.
4654, 106th Cong. §§2,4 (2000), and Protection of United States Troops From Foreign Prosecution Act of
1999, H.R. 2381, 106th Cong. §§2-3 (1999).
5. See Status of Rome Statute, supra note 2. See also Scott W. Andreason, The International Criminal
Court: Does the Constitution Preclude Its Ratification by the United States?, 85 IOWA L. REv. 697, 699
(2000).
6. Diane F. Orentlicher, U.S. Cheats Justice in Opposing World Court, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1998 at
M2. (Author further criticizes U.S. delegation: "[T]he U.S. government's approach to the Rome conference
was a study in ill-conceived strategy.").
7. See Jesse Helms, We Must Slay This Monster: Voting Against the International Criminal Court Is
Not Enough. The U.S. Should Try to Bring It Down, FIN. TIMES, July 31, 1998, at 1 (Senator Helms declared
"so long as there is breath in me, the US will never - I repeat, never - allow its national security decisions to
be judged by an International Criminal Court."). See also John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, By Large Major-
ity, U.N. Conference in Rome Approves Permanent International Criminal Court, 4 INT'L L. UPDATE 99
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Given that the United States often claims a role of international peacekeeper, and
defender of human rights, this reluctance to sign the Rome Statute at first blush seemed
antithetical to the proposed ideals by which the United States conducts its foreign af-
fairs. This article reviews the primary objections of the United States to the Rome Stat-
ute, and counters them with the following proposition: The United States quite accu-
rately believes that signing and ratifying the Rome Statute would render members of the
United States' military vulnerable to the jurisdiction of the ICC; however, this vulner-
ability is mitigated by ample procedural protections, and is outweighed by the possibil-
ity, albeit unproven, that the ICC may function as a chilling influence on violence in the
shadow of a century characterized by unspeakable atrocities and widespread suffering.
A. The United States' Signature of the Rome Statute
As a preliminary matter, one must note that the United States has signed the Rome
Statute. "On December 31, with the country distracted by the New Year's revels, Bill
Clinton announced that the U.S. would sign the [Rome Statute] to establish an Interna-
tional Criminal Court. He characterized his decision as an act of 'moral leadership'.
' 8
Perhaps Mr. Clinton's goal of leadership was realized as Israel also signed the Rome
Statute on December 31, 2000.9 "The move was prompted largely by President Bill
Clinton's decision on Sunday night to join the more than 130 signatures [of the Rome
Statue] .... Mr. Clinton's stance gave the Israelis the feeling that the U.S. would use its
weight to protect the Jewish state within the new body."'10
While some may claim United States' signature of the Rome Statue "is a significant
development because it counters a growing trend of isolationism in U.S. foreign pol-
icy[,]"" and a step back from "a policy of constructive disengagement[,]' 2 such may
not be the case. Rather, as December 31, 2000 marked the deadline for signature of the
Rome Statute, the signature by the Clinton Administration may have been a strategic
move by the government to enable United States involvement in the preparatory com-
mittees of the ICC without first ratifying that Rome Statute, as would be the case after
(1998) ("Even if the executive branch had supported the Statute, Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the U.S.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that a proposal for an international tribunal that could prosecute
American soldiers for war crimes would be 'dead on arrival' at his Committee.").
8. Jeremy Rabkin, A Dangerous Court, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 3, 2001 at A14. (The author went on to de-
scribe the signature as "a betrayal of American interests.").
9. See Status of Rome Statute, supra note 2.
10. Ben Lynfield, Israel Joins U.S. in Backing World Court, SCOTsMAN, Jan. 2., 2001 at 9. As in the
U.S., the Rome Statute did not receive whole-hearted support:
'It is pregnant with troubles for the future,' [Elyakim Rubenstein, attorney-general of Israel,]
said, stressing that most of the signatories to the international court treaty would interpret
Israel's large scale settlement of Jews in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a 'war-crime'.
11. William J. Aceves, It is Time to Abandon Constructive Disengagement as U.S. Foreign Policy, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 5, 2001 at B7.
12. Id. at B7.
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the deadline.13 Although signature is often a prelude to Senate ratification, and ratifica-
tion appears unlikely in the United States regarding the Rome Statute, the United States
may now be committed, under existing international law, not to act in any way that
would undermine [the Rome Statute]. That is the obligation of states that sign a treaty
before they ratify it, according to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
And in general terms, the obligation makes sense: Countries should not sign treaties
with their fingers tied behind their backs."
1 4
The remainder of this article will begin with a brief discussion of twentieth century
international criminal tribunals - from Nuremberg through the currently convened ad
hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. This discussion will serve to
illustrate the scope of the Rome Statute in comparison, as well as one of the primary
United States objections - the as of yet undefined crime of aggression.' 5 Second, this
article will attempt an explanation of the triggering mechanism and procedure of the
ICC through an illustrative hypothetical situation with United States involvement. This
discussion will highlight both the procedural objections of the United States, and the
safeguards of the Rome Statute that make these fears understandable, but unnecessary.
Third, this article will discuss remaining objections of the United States: Constitutional
objections raised by various congressmen, and the fear of a politicized, litigious court.
Finally, this article will demonstrate that while the ICC may not prove to be a perfect
body, it will be more effective as it is now proposed, than it would be if the Conference
of Plenipotentiaries had adopted either the P-5 or United States compromise proposals
for Article 12 of the Rome Statute.
HI. PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS COMPARED TO THE ICC
A. Previous International Criminal Tribunals
A tribunal with the goal of bringing individuals to justice for heinous international
crimes is not without precedent. The United States played an important role in the Nur-
emberg 16 and Tokyo17 prosecutions of Axis powers after World War II. The United
13. See id. at B7. (President Clinton stated: "We [sign the Rome Statute] to reaffirm our strong support
for international accountability ... [and] we do so as well because we wish to remain engaged in making the
[ICC] an instrument of impartial and effective justice in the years to come.").
14. Rabkin, supra note 8, at A14.
15. In 1974 a United Nations General Assembly defined aggression as "the use of armed force by a State
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition." (G.A. Res. 3314, U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/963 1, Annex (1974), re-printed in JORDAN J. PAUST
ET. AL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 24 (2000). See also Benjamin B. Ferencz,
Aggression, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 58, 60-63 (Rudolph Bernhardt et al. eds.,
1992). This definition did not prove sufficient for the Rome Conference, and aggression now plays an impor-
tant role in United States' objections to the Rome Statute. See infra Section II(C), notes 29-48.
16. See The Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg [hereinafter Nuremberg Char-
2001]
Journal of Legislation
States also participated in the formation of ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR).18 A comprehensive discussion of these tribunals is beyond
the scope of this paper, and has been undertaken by other authors.' 9 However, certain
aspects of these tribunals should be compared and contrasted with the proposed scope of
the ICC to provide a better basis for understanding the United States' reservations.
B. Comparison Between the ICC and Other International Criminal Tribunals
The four tribunals mentioned above overlap in some of the crimes they claimed
within their respective jurisdictions. Crimes against humanity were prosecuted by both
WWII tribunals, 20 and are currently within the competence of the ICTY and ICTR.
2 1
The proposed ICC would also have competence over crimes against humanity,22 al-
though the definition of such crimes in the Rome Statute is of arguably wider scope than
as contained in previous tribunals, regarding the subject of the offence.2 3 While the defi-
nition in the Rome Statute is more expansive than those of past tribunals, it is not neces-
sarily more clear. The ICC will have jurisdiction over "a course of conduct involving the
multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 [of Article 7] against any civilian
population, in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack. 24
ter], Aug. 8, 1945), 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
17. See U.S. Dep't of the Army Pamphlet No. 27-161-2, II INTERNATIONAL LAW 233-34 (1962) cited in
JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 631 (2d ed. 2000):
The basic policy for the trial and punishment of Japanese war criminals was the Potsdam Dec-
laration of 26 July 1945 jointly issued by China, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.A. The
U.S.S.R. subsequently adhered to it. By the Instrument of Surrender, signed on 2 September
1945, Japan accepted the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration. General MacArthur... was
then directed by the United States to proceed with the trial of Japanese war criminals. Though
approved by other nations this action was unilateral on the part of the United States.
18. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., 3217th mtg. at 29, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1159091 [hereinafter ICTY
Statute]; see also International Tribunal for Rwanda S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3453d mtg. at
__ , U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. The United
States is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and could have used its veto power to
stop the formation of these ad hoc tribunals.
19. See, e.g., THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL - AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM (C. Hosoya, N. Ando,
Y. Onuma, R. Minear eds. 1986) cited in JORDAN J. PAUST ET. AL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 632 (2d
ed. 2000); see also Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in International
Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv 321 (2000).
20. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 16, art. 6(c); see also Tokyo Charter for the International Mili-
tary Tribunal for the Far East (1946) [hereinafter Tokyo Charter] as amended by General Orders No. 20 (26
April 1946). T.L.A.S. No. 1589.
21. See ICTY Statute, supra note 18, art. 5; ICTR Statute, supra note 18, Art. 3.
22. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7.
23. See ICTY Statute, supra note 18, art. 5(g) (crimes against humanity include, inter alia, the crime of
rape). See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(g) criminalizing rape, as well as "sexual slavery, enforced prosti-
tution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable grav-
ityt.]").
24. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(a).
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The question remains, though, just what numerosity requirement is to be inferred in the
term "multiple commission of acts[,]" and just what nexus must be demonstrated be-
tween "a State or organizational policy" and the acts of one or more individuals accused
of crimes against humanity. The issue could be clarified somewhat by the preamble to
the Rome Statute, which states the court shall have complimentary "jurisdiction over the
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole." But while
this statement of purpose may relieve the court of one case of murder simplicitor com-
mitted during a war, the international community as a whole is surely concerned with
torture against a civilian population.25 Thus, although it may be an unlikely and extreme
result of this ambiguous definition, according to one jurist from the United Kingdom,
"[i]f countries the world over ratified the Rome Statute then torturers alone could make
the ICC much busier than an inner-city magistrates' court on a Monday morning. 26
No other single crime covered by the Rome Statute has been included in the statutes
of all four international tribunals mentioned above. The ICTY and the ICTR have juris-
diction over a distinct crime of genocide, while the post WWII tribunals considered it
within crimes against humanity.27 The post WWII tribunals made an offence of war
crimes, as does the ICTY, but not the ICTR. And the post WWII tribunals had jurisdic-
tion over crimes against peace, much as the ICC will have jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression, but the ICTY and ICTR do not. While all of the crimes, as defined in the
Rome Statute, contain some ambiguity, surely none has met with more controversy than
the crime of aggression, as witnessed by the fact that the Rome Conference did not in-
clude a definition of this crime within the statute.28
C. The Undefined Crime of Aggression
Few United States citizens may realize the importance of this missing definition,
and even fewer, outside of lawyers, may realize the extreme difficulty in defining this
25. While torture and murder are both crimes, international agreements and decisions certainly highlight
torture as particularly heinous, and an international offence; isolated cases of murder may not rise to this level.
See Convention Against torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, G.A. Res.
832, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), reprinted in JORDAN J. PAUST
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 278 (2000). See also Regina v. Bow
Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International and
others intervening) (No. 3) 2 All ER 97, 166 (1999) (Lord Hutton states: "Therefore I consider that a single act
of torture carried out, or instigated by, a public official, or other person acting in an official capacity consti-
tutes a crime against international law, and that torture does not become an international crime only when it is
committed or instigated on a large scale.").
26. John Holbrook, 'World Court' is a Creature of Politics Rather Than Justice, THE TIMES (London),
Sept. 26, 2000.
27. Compare ICTY Statute, supra note 18, art. 4 and ICTR Statute, supra note 18, art. 2, with Nurem-
berg Charter, supra note 16, art. 6.
28. See Rome Statute, supra note 1. (claims jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in article 5, but then
fails to define it within later articles. It has been left for further debate, and eventual amendment by the proc-
esses set out in articles 9 and 121).
20011
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crime.29 While individuals or states across the globe may occasionally blame the United
States of committing any one of the crimes listed in the Rome Statute, the issue of a
statutory definition of the crime of aggression bears heavily on the conscience of United
States policy makers. 30 The strongest international criminal claims against the United
States may be that the United States has recently engaged in illegally aggressive activi-
ties, in both Iraq and Kosovo.3 1
United States and allied action in the defence of Kuwait was premised on a state's
inherent right of collective self defence as embodied in the Charter of the United Na-
tions. 32 Although the Security Council did direct member states to effect its mandates by
using "all necessary means" in restoring "international peace and security to the area," it
did not specifically authorize the use of force 33 - an option surely within its powers.
34
Assuming for the moment that the use of force itself did not violate international law,
the coalition force was nonetheless limited in its actions of collective self-defence. The
United States and its allies were bound by the principle of proportionality to the goal
desired.35 In essence, the force used should not have exceeded that required to establish
the safety of Kuwait. The United States, in bombing major Iraqi cities, industry and
infrastructure, may have exceeded this limit imposed by norms of international law.
3 6
The ICC will never have the opportunity to hear such a case made by Iraqi statesmen.
The Rome Statute provides that the ICC will only have jurisdiction over situations that
29. See JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 708 (2d ed.
2000). (An early attempt at the creation of an international criminal court "was permanently shelved due to the
absence of an internationally accepted definition of the crime of 'aggression'[.]").
30. See Bruce Fein, Torching the Constitution, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Aug. 01, 2000 at AI 8:
Many nations accused the United States of aggression in the Vietnam War and aggression
in the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco launched against Fidel Castro's Cuba. And some accuse us
today of aggression against Slobodon Milosevic's Yugoslavia for our bombing in retalia-
tion for internal ethnic cleansing and Saddam Hussein's Iraq by establishing de facto pro-
tectorates for Iraqi Kurds and Shi'ites .... The United States fire-bombed Tokyo, killing
tens of thousands of civilians.., and dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
with similar gruesome consequences. Many to this day claim the civilian carnage was
clearly excessive in relation to the goal of Japanese surrender.
See also David J. Scheffer, Developments in International Criminal Law: The United States and the In-
ternational Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L .L. 12, 21 (1999). ("This political concession to the most persis-
tent advocates of a crime of aggression without a definition and without the linkage to a prior Security Council
determination that an act of aggression has occurred deeply concerns the United States.").
31. See infra notes 32-41.
32. See U.N. Charter art. 51 [hereinafter U.N. Charter] "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
Id.
33. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 27, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
34. See U.N. Charter, supra note 32, art. 42.
35. See Shaw J. Dallal, International Law and the United Nations' Role in the Gulf Crisis, 18 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & COM. 111, 138 (1992).
36. See id.
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arise after the court is finally formed. 7 Coalition action in Kuwait is, however, the type
of case that could easily draw the scrutiny of the ICC if repeated in the future, and im-
plicate officials and politicians of the United States government under the doctrine of
command responsibility as enshrined in the Rome Statute.
38
If the ICC were functioning two years ago, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia may
have had more luck in prosecuting NATO members than it did before the International
Court of Justice.3 9 The NATO allies commenced the bombing of the Former Yugoslavia
in a humanitarian mission in 1999. This action, though, was of questionable legality.
The 1945 UN Charter arguably reaffirmed the pre-WWI sentiment that prohibited in-
tervention by one nation into the internal affairs of another, whether committed in the
name of humanitarian concern or not.40 And, while the Security Council effectively
ratified NATO's action in Kosovo after the fact in Resolution 1244, 41 had the ICC been
in existence it may have heard loud calls for examination from Yugoslavia. If Yugosla-
via were a member of the ICC at the time of the attacks, or accepted ICC jurisdiction
after the attacks, these cries would be difficult for the ICC to ignore. Of course, in situa-
tions similar to those above the Prosecutor or Trial chamber may decide not to hear the
case, but the possibility remains of United States involvement as a defendant in an inter-
national criminal trial.
United States involvement would not mean, though, that the United States itself
would be listed as the defendant. Rather, the ICC will have jurisdiction over individu-
als.42 This personal liability is extended through the doctrine of command responsibility
to military commanders, those acting as military commanders, and those superiors of
subordinates under his or her effective control that commit a crime under the Rome
Statute.43 Although it will remain to be seen how the ICC deals with the issue of com-
mand responsibility, an informed American judgment regarding the Rome Statute
should consider that trials of international criminals have convicted non-governmental
and non-military individuals." This may not arise regarding the crime of aggression, per
se, but surely functions to cast the net wider in the search for criminals.
37. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 11 ("The Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes
committed after the entry into force of this Statute.").
38. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 27 ("Irrelevance of official capacity"), 28 ("Responsibility of
commanders and other superiors"); see infra notes 42-44.
39. The International Court of Justice found that it lacked jurisdiction, unless explicitly accepted for that
matter, by the NATO members. See Peter H. F. Bekker, International Decision: Legality of the Use of Force,
International Court of Justice, June 2, 1999, 93 AM. J. INT'L .L. 928 (1999).
40. See Louis Henkin, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo and the Law of "Humanitarian Interven-
tion ", 93 AM. J. INT'L .L. 824 (1999).
41. See id. at 827.
42. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 25(1) ("The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons
pursuant to this Statute.").
43. See id. at art. 28.
44. See U.S. Dept. of Army Pamphlet No. 27-161-2, II International Law 224, 226-33 (1962), reprinted
in JORDAN J. PAUST ET. AL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 288 (2d ed. 2000). (Pursuant to Allied Control
Council Law No. 10, German industrialists, inter alia, were brought to trial and convicted as war criminals.).
2001]
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One commentator counters American concerns about aggression with the assertion
that the crime of aggression may only be defined by amendment to the Rome Statute
after seven years of operation. 45 While this is certainly true according to the explicit
terms of Article 121 of the Rome Statute, the further assertion that "it is important to
bear in mind that any amendment under Article 121 is binding only on those state par-
ties that explicitly consent to it,"'4 6 - and thus the United States need not fear a definition
of aggression - may not be completely true. Article 121(4 and 5) of the Rome Statute
states:
Except as provided in paragraph 5, an amendment shall enter into force for all States
Parties one year after instruments of ratification or acceptance have been deposited
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations by seven-eighths of them.
Any amendment to Article 5, 6, 7, and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force for those
States Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their
instruments of ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State Party which has not ac-
cepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime
covered by the amendment when committed by that State Party's nationals or on its
territory.
47
The above provisions indicate that an amendment to Article 5 of the Rome Statute
may not bind all states, even in the face of overwhelming support. But paragraph 4 of
Article 121 shows that amendments ratified by seven-eighths of States Parties will bind
all States Parties so long as they do not amend Article 5. Article 5 already includes the
crime of aggression, and the inclusion of a definition of aggression would not require an
amendment of Article 5.48 Although amendment of Article 5 may be desired in such
45. See Scott W. Andreasen, The International Criminal Court: Does the Constitution Preclude Its Rati-
fication by the United States?, 85 IowA L. REv. 697,717 (2000).
46. Id. at 717, emphasis added.
47. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art 121.
48. See id. art. 5:
1. The jurisdiction of this Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the follow-
ing crimes:
(d) The crime of aggression.
2. The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in ac-
cordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime an setting out the conditions under which the
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the
relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
If a definition of the crime of aggression is presented at the close of seven years it may be desirable, but
not necessary, to remove Paragraph 2 from article 5. Thus, a definition of aggression would take effect under
article 121(3 and 4). Note that the term "States Parties" is used in previous Paragraphs of article 121 to refer
to States Parties to the Rome Statute. While one may stretch the wording of Paragraph 4 to bind only "States
Parties" to one particular amendment, this would run contrary to the use of the term in other provisions of the
Rome Statute, and within article 121 itself.
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circumstances, it wouldstill function adequately as it currently stands. Thus, a definition
of aggression may be promulgated under article 121(4), and would require only seven-
eighths of States Parties to ratify the amendment for it to become binding on all States
Parties, whether they ratify it or not. It may be important to notice the irony, though,
embodied in the terms of Article 121. As states party to the Rome Statute may add new
crimes to Article 5 of the Rome Statute they may also opt out of ICC jurisdiction on
such crimes. Non-parties to the Rome Statute may not. Thus a state may hypothetically
limit its liability for damnable action by pledging alliance to the ICC.
4 9
The differences between the ICC and the tribunals discussed above may be in large
part because the ICC is meant to be a proactive body.50 The other tribunals were all
created in reaction to particular events. In the case of post WWII tribunals the war had
already concluded, and the victors were in the position to mete out justice to the de-
feated. The ICC will thus avoid claims of "victors' justice" leveled against the Nurem-
berg and Tokyo prosecutions.-5 While the ad hoc ICTY and ICTR were convened after
the beginning of conflict in their respective regions, they are surely contemporary to
their respective conflicts, and may eventually avoid the label given to the previous tri-
bunals. The ICTY and ICTR are still, nonetheless, essentially reactions to situations in
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the statute of each body displays its nature as
such.52 Beyond a remedy to the accusation of "victors' justice," the ICC has also been
presented as a cost-effective alternative to ad hoc tribunals, and a forum for the consis-
tent development of case law regarding international criminal law.53
Finally, the triggering mechanism of the ICC, discussed in the next section, is dif-
ferent from that of the ICTY or ICTR. The ICTY and ICTR are both tailored to fit their
respective conflicts, and claim primacy over national courts;54 in contrast, the ICC at-
49. See Scheffer,, supra note 30, at 20.
50. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 24 ("Non-retroactivity ratione personae").
51. See Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in International Criminal
Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV 321, 334-35 (2000):
In many regards, Nuremberg is a dark shadow ominously clouding the history of interna-
tional criminal law. Nuremberg still stands as a testament to the fact that the laws of war are
meted out by the victors of war. Hence, modem scholars of international law attempt to ig-
nore and minimize the concerns regarding "victors' justice" and the application of ex post
facto laws.
See also M2 Presswire, U.N.: Steps to Full-Functioning !nt'l Criminal Court Discussed as Sixth Commit-
tee Considers Rome Statute, Oct. 23, 1998 available in 1998 WL 16529473 (Report on Croation U.N. Repre-
sentative Ivan Simonovic's comment: "[A]herence to the principle of 'victors' justice [has] been broken with
the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and for the Former Yugoslavia, as those
bodies [have] jurisdiction over perpetrators from all sides to the conflict.").
52. The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were to a large extent internal, and thus neither
respective statute contains the crime of aggression. Likewise, as Rwanda was almost exclusively an internal
conflict, the ICTR Statute criminalizes violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of
Additional Protocol II (see ICTR Statute, supra note 18, art. 3), but does not mention war crimes - more appli-
cable in primarily international conflict.
53. See Scheffer, supra note 30, at 13.
54. See ICTY Statute, supra note 18, art. 9; ICTR Statute, supra note 18, art. 8.
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tempts to maintain the flexibility to deal with all possible future conflicts, and makes a
dubious claim of complementarity to national courts.55
11I. THE TRIGGERING MECHANISM OF THE ICC
Upon completion of the Rome Statute many states made commentary relating their
positions on the International Criminal Court as it is now conceived. The United States,
as a non-signatory, presented the following hypothetical situation in an attempt to dis-
credit the complementarity regime of Article 12 as an inhibition of efforts to help protect
international peace and security:
A state not party to the treaty launched a campaign of terror against a dissident minor-
ity inside its territory. Thousands of innocent civilians were killed. International peace
and security were imperiled. The United States participated in a coalition to use mili-
tary force to intervene and stop the killing. Unfortunately, in so doing, bombs intended
for military targets went astray. A hospital was hit. An apartment building was demol-
ished. Some civilians being used as human shields were mistakenly shot by United
States troops. The State responsible for the atrocities demanded that United States offi-
cials and commanders should be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court. The
demand was supported by a small group of other States.
56
A. Obtaining Jurisdiction Over a Situation Under the Rome Statute
To understand the implications of the above hypothetical for the United States one
must examine it from three potential permutations in which countries involved are, or
are not members to the Rome Statute. First, where either the United States, or both the
United States and the territorial state have ratified or acceded to the Rome Statute. Sec-
ond, where the United States has not, but the territorial state has ratified or acceded to
the Rome Statute. And finally, where neither the United States nor the territorial state
has acceded to the Rome Statute.
If only the United States, or both the United States and the territorial country of the
above hypothetical, were members to the Rome Statute the question of jurisdiction
would be easily answered. The ICC would undoubtedly have the opportunity to exam-
ine, and possibly hear the case, if they believed it was meritorious, subject only to the
constraints of complementarity, discussed below. This jurisdiction would be based in the
universal jurisdiction provision of the Rome Statute - a blanket acceptance of the
court's jurisdiction for the crimes defined in Article 5.57
55. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17 ("Issues of admissibility"); see also id. at Preamble. ("Em-
phasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to na-
tional criminal jurisdictions .... ").
56. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 633 (Roy S. Lee ed.,
1999) (citing A/C.6/53/SR.9, 21 October 1998).
57. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(1) ("A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby
accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.").
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If the state where the situation occurred (i.e. the territorial state) were a member to
the Rome Statute, the Court would have jurisdiction if any State Party to the Statute
referred the situation to the prosecutor, if the Security Council, operating under its
Chapter VII powers refers the situation to the prosecutor, or if the prosecutor initiated an
investigation propio motu.58 According to representatives of the United States depart-
ment of State, this power of the court, its ability to bring non-party states within its ju-
risdiction, may be beyond the auspices of international law.59 This is not to say that acts
by non-party states proscribed by the Rome Statute would be legal simply because the
state is a non-party. Rather, "[w]hile certain conduct is prohibited under customary in-
ternational law and might be the object of universal jurisdiction by a national court, the
establishment of, and a state's participation in, an international criminal court are not
derived from custom but, rather, from the requirements of treaty law.",60 This statement
may find support in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the
North Sea Continental Shelf 61 the ICJ provided three criteria for application to multilat-
eral conventions to determine whether they have attained the status of customary inter-
national law. The first criterion states that the provisions of the convention must be "of a
fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis
of a general rule of law."62 The two remaining criteria required widespread and repre-
sentative state practice and opiniojuris.63 While the Rome Statute boasts wide signature
and may eventually make a similar claim of wide adherence, it is doubtful that the pro-
cedural requirements and rules of a tribunal are of a "norm creating" character, and thus
binding on non-member states. The same contention applies also to the following per-
mutation, in which the ICC might obtain jurisdiction over a situation involving two or
more non-party states.
If neither the United States, nor the territorial state of the above hypothetical were
58. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(2):
In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one
or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction
of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime
was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or
aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.
59. See David J. Scheffer, Developments at Rome Treaty Conference, Testimony Before the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, July 23, 1998 (visited Nov. 11, 2000); <http://www.state.gov/www/policy- re-
marks/1998/980723_scheffer_icc.html> United States Participation in the United Nations, REPORT BY THE
PRESIDENT TO CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1998 at 85 (Dep't of St. publication 10623) ("First, and most objec-
tionable, is the purported extent of the court's jurisdiction, which would reach nationals, and thus the official
acts, of states that have not consented to the treaty.") available in <http://www.state.gov/www/isues/unpart
/1998/98part6.pdf>.
60. Scheffer, supra note 48 at 18.
61. (W. Ger. v. Den., W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
62. Id. at 42.
63. See id.
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members to the Rome Statute, it is still possible that the ICC could obtain jurisdiction
over the situation. The Rome Statute provides that a state that is not party to the statute
may accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the court with respect to the crime in ques-
tion.64 In operation, then, provided that the Security Council does not take action, this
state may commit questionable conduct with respect to its own citizens and then accept
the jurisdiction of the court only with respect to crimes allegedly committed by any
force attempting humanitarian intervention. Thus, in relation to the above hypothetical,
"in the absence of a Security Council referral, the Court could not investigate those re-
sponsible for killing thousands, yet the United States officials, commanders and soldiers
[who tried to stop the killing] could face an international investigation and even
prosecution." 65 From a United States perspective, regarding the latter two of the three
permutations above, the prospect of Security Council reference of the hypothetical case
to the ICC is very nearly a moot point, as the United States has vto power conferred
under United Nations Charter.
66
B. Bars to the Exercise of ICC Jurisdiction
Simply because the ICC has jurisdiction over a situation does not mean that the case
will be held automatically admissible and tried before the trial chamber. As a prelimi-
nary issue, the prosecutor may decide to take no action on a referral from a state if there
is not a "reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation." 67 If the prosecutor decides
that there is a reasonable basis to continue with an investigation, she will notify all states
that would normally have jurisdiction over the situation in question. In the above hypo-
thetical, the United States would have three possible courses of action: proceed with the
case in the ICC; petition the Security Council for a one year deferral of the case;68 or
take jurisdiction of the case upon itself, under the doctrine of complementarity. 69 The
following discussion assumes that the United States legal system is the only system
outside of the ICC that has a valid jurisdictional claim over the actions in question. It is
possible, though, that a situation may arise in which two nations have equally valid
claims of jurisdiction over the accused, as well as the ICC. Thus, the question may still
remain, with little guidance from the Rome Statute, of which system or body should
have jurisdiction over the accused if the state of nationality declines the case.
64. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(3).
65. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 633 (Roy S. Lee ed.,
1999) (citing AIC.6/531SR.9, 21 October 1998).
66. See U.N. Charter, supra note 32, art. 27(3).
67. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15(3); see also art. 18(1).
68. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 16.
69. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, Preamble paragraph 10, ar. 1, 17.
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1. United States Acquiescence to the Jurisdiction of the ICC
In the unlikely event that the United States voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction
of the ICC, the United States would not be without option to challenge the validity of
the charges before a referring nation. Before the prosecutor could begin an investigation
she must present her intentions, and supporting evidence, to the Pre-Trial Chamber of
the ICC.70 Only if the Pre-Trial Chamber authorizes the investigation - satisfied that
there is reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation and that the case appears to
fall within the jurisdiction of the court - will the investigation continue.7 1 Such a deter-
mination by the Pre-Trial chamber, though, will not prejudice later determinations by
the court regarding the jurisdiction or admissibility of the case.72
Upon completion of the prosecutor's investigation the court must satisfy itself that
it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it. Objections to this jurisdiction may come
from either an accused person summoned before the court, a state which has jurisdiction
over the case and is investigating the case on its own, or a state from which acceptance
of jurisdiction is required under Article 12. Thus the Untied States, if it believed that
the actions for which it was accused of a crime under the Rome Statute were not illegal
or beyond of the jurisdiction of the court, would have one opportunity to challenge its
prosecution on such grounds. 74 If the court found the case to be admissible, the United
States, or more precisely, those accused, would continue in an adversarial manner pre-
scribed by the Rome Statute, and the recently published rules of procedure and evi-
dence.
2. Security Council Intervention in the Jurisdiction of the ICC
If the United States was opposed to the ICC exerting its jurisdiction over one of its
nationals it may be afforded a period of respite through Security Council action. Al-
though it may be difficult to garner adequate support,
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this
Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to
that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.75
Such a resolution by the Security Council would require the consent of all five per-
manent members, though, and a majority of at least nine votes from the fifteen Security
Council members.76 Furthermore, as the resolution must fall within the auspices of
70. See id. art. 15(3).
71. See id. art. 15(4).
72. See id.
73. See id., supra note 1, art. 19.
74. See id.
75. See id.at art. 16.
76. See U.N. Charter, supra note 32, art. 27.
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Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter the United States would be faced with the
task of demonstrating how deferral of prosecution would be a necessary action pursuant
to a determination of "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression"
and necessary "to maintain or restore international peace and security.",77 It may not be
impossible for the United States to gain such support, given the realties of international
politics, but from a legal point of view, justification for such action may prove quite
thin. Furthermore, such action would only buy the United States time,78 with renewal of
the deferral facing the same challenges mentioned above.
3. Deferral to the United States based on Complementarity
The provisions of the Rome Statute embodying its early claims of creating a com-
plimentary court, rather than a primary court, are embodied in Article 17. The idea is
simply stated, although its application may remain mysterious: That the ICC will defer
jurisdiction in all cases to domestic proceedings "unless the State is unwilling or unable
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution. 79 This caveat to the principle of
complementarity has the obvious goal of overcoming sham prosecutions, designed to
either protect or railroad those accused of heinous crimes. And although the Statute does
provide some criteria by which to judge the validity of proceedings, 80 or the ability of a
national court system,8' it threatens to undermine the principle as a whole. The Rome
Statute simply does not state what burden of proof shall be used in determining inability
or unwillingness. Furthermore, the Rome Statute does not state on whom such a burden
shall lay - must states defend their jurisdictional claims, or must the Prosecutor prove
inability or unwillingness? The Rome Statute does refer to "principles of due process
recognized by international law[," but doesn't define just what these principles are.82
Finally, within a military tribunal classified information may prove to be exculpa-
tory. Should such information be made available to the public, or the ICC, the United
States military may fear a breach of national security. Thus, and individual exculpated
by sensitive materials may still face skepticism from the international community, as he
or she cannot reveal the justification for a dismissal of charges. Should that individual
be brought before the ICC, the United States government may refuse to provide sensi-
tive information,83 thus creating an unpleasant dilemma between defending an individual
and defending important information.
77. Id. at art. 39.
78. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 16.
79. Id. at art. 17(1)(a).
80. See id. art. 17(2).
81. See id. art. 17(3).
82. d.at art. 17(2).
83. Id. art. 72.
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IV. REMAINING UNITED STATES OBJECTIONS TO THE ROME STATUTE AND THE
ICC
Through proposed legislation United States Congressmen have raised a number of
constitutionally based objections to the Rome Statute.84 United States representatives
also remain fearful of the inclusion of the crimes of aggression and drug trafficking
within the proposed jurisdiction of the ICC.8 5 Finally, fears of a highly politicized court
have heightened the resolve of some in opposition to the ICC.
A. Constitutional Objections
1. Contention: The ICC does not provide Americans their constitutional right to a
jury trial
Proposed legislation in both houses of Congress claims, in similar terms, that "[a]ny
American prosecuted by the International Criminal Court will, under the Rome Statute,
be denied many of the procedural protections to which all Americans are entitled under
the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution, including, among others, the right to
trial by jury[.],, 86 While it is true that the ICC will not try defendants before a jury of
their peers, the proposed legislation may mischaracterize a defendant's rights. While the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution does state that "in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impar-
tial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 87 the
jurisprudence of United States courts has displayed that a jury may not always be an
inviolable Constitutional right.
In Ex parte Quirin8 8 the United States Supreme Court considered habeas corpus pe-
titions by German submariners who arrived by submarine to the eastern coast of the
United States. The German High Command had armed these would-be saboteurs with
explosive and instructions to destroy American war facilities.89 Upon apprehension, the
President convened a military commission to try the defendants for charges, among
others, that they, "being enemies of the United States and acting for .. the German
Reich, a belligerent enemy nation, secretly and covertly passed, in civilian dress, con-
trary to the law of war .... ,9o The issue decided by the Supreme Court was "whether it
84. See American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2000, S. 2726, 106th Cong. (2000); see also H.R.
4654, 106th Cong. (2000), and Protection of United States Troops From Foreign Prosecution Act of 1999,
H.R. 2381, 106th Cong. (1999).
85. See Scheffer, supra note 30, at 13.
86. American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2000, S. 2726, see also H.R. 4654, and Protection of
United States Troops From Foreign Prosecution Act of 1999, H.R. 2381.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
88. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
89. See id. at 21.
90. See id. at 36.
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is within the constitutional power of the National Government to place petitioners upon
trial before a military commission for the offences with which they are charged." 9' After
reviewing the history of trials regarding violations of the law of war, the Court found
that "these petitioners were charged with an offence against the law of war which the
Constitution does not require to be tried by a jury. 9 2 The Court held that:
mhe Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not restrict whatever authority was conferred
by the Constitution to try offences against the law of war by military commission, and
that petitioners, charged with such an offence not required to be tried by jury at com-
mon law, were lawfully placed on trial by the Commission without a jury.93
The United States Court for Berlin later commented on the decision of Ex parte
Quirin in the case of United States v. Tiede.94 The court stated:
Quirin does not stand for the proposition that the nature of the tribunal dictates whether
defendants must be accorded a trial by jury or that individuals tried before a military
commission are never entitled to a jury. Quirin holds that whether an individual is enti-
tled to a jury trial is determined by the nature of the crime with which he is charged. 95
It is instructive to note that the Rome Statute describes crimes that are far from
"garden-variety" felonies. The crimes within the competence of the ICC, with the possi-
ble exception of drug trafficking, if it is included in the near future, are violations of the
laws of war, international customary law, and in some cases, jus cogens.96
a. The "Extradition Analogy"
Even Americans charged with "garden-variety" felonies in peacetime may not al-
ways receive a jury trial. The United States has formed bilateral extradition treaties with
over one hundred other nations, 97 not all of which guarantee the right to a trial by jury in
felony proceedings. 98 Furthermore, in respect of the national sovereignty of other na-
tions, citizens of the United States who commit crimes in foreign countries are subjected
91. Id. at 29.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 45.
94. Crim. Case No. 78-001A (U.S. Ct. for Berlin Mar. 14, 1979), 85 F.R.D. 227 (1979), reprinted in 19
I.L.M. 179 (1980).
95. Id. at 199 (emphasis in the original).
96. Principles jus cogens, simply stated, are peremptory norms in international law, from which states
may not derogate in their actions or treaty relations. The international condemnation of Genocide has often
been cited as an example of jus cogens. See JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 5 (2d
ed. 2000).
97. See JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DOCUMENTs SUPPLEMENT 371
(2000).
98. See e.g., 32 UST 1485 (1978). The United States has a bilateral extradition treaty with the Federal
Republic of Germany 32 UST 1485 (1978). Neither the German Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozes-
sordnung), nor the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) provides a felony defendant the right to a trial by jury.
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to the criminal law and procedure of the prosecuting state, and are not guaranteed the
right of a jury.
This analogy to extradition was strongly criticized by one commentator: "The ex-
tradition analogy... provides no support to those commentators who claim that the U.S.
Constitution could not bar American participation in the ICC." 99 In support of the propo-
sition that the Bill of Rights may apply to Americans before the ICC he cites the follow-
ing language from United States v. Balsys:1
00
If it could be said that the United States and its allies had enacted substantially similar
criminal codes aimed at prosecuting offences of international character, and if it could
be shown that the United States was granting immunity from domestic prosecution for
the purpose of obtaining evidence to be delivered to other nations as prosecutors of a
crime common to both countries, then an argument could be made that the [Bill of
Rights] should apply... The point would be that the prosecution was as much on be-
half of the United States as of the prosecuting nation. 101
While the Supreme Court decided that Balsys did not present such a situation, one
commentator clain the ICC would provide an analogous situation, assuming United
States participation in the court, selection of judges, financing of its operation and sitting
on the Assembly of State Parties.102 This would supposedly create a situation in which
"any prosecutions undertaken by the court - whether involving the actions of Americans
in the United States or overseas - would be 'as much on behalf of the United States as
of any other state party."
' 10 3
While it is possible that the United States will provide information to the ICC for
the prosecution of its citizens this will likely occur only after the United States has been
shown unwilling or unable to carry out its own prosecution' °4 - thus casting doubt on a
claim that the United States is as much a part of the prosecution as the ICC itself. Also,
Balsys dealt heavily with the Fifth Amendment rights of an alien, living in the U.S.,
fearful that information exchanged for immunity would be used in foreign prosecution.
The Court actually addressed these dicta to the Fifth Amendment, and did not explicitly
extend them to include the rest of the Bill of Rights, the Sixth Amendment included.
The actual statement of the court states that "an argument could be made that the Fifth
Amendment should apply based on fear of foreign prosecution simply because that
prosecution was not fairly characterized as distinctly 'foreign." ' 10 5 Furthermore, the
99. See Andreasen, supra note 45, at 730 n.2.
100. 524 U.S. 666 (1998).
.101. Id. at 698, quoted in Andreasen, supra note 45, at 728.
102. See Andreasen, supra note 98, at 729.
103. Id. at 729, (quoting Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?: Hearings
on the U.N. Int'l Criminal Court Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Operations 'of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 105th Cong. (1998)).
104. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17.
105. 524 U.S. at 698 (emphasis added).
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"extradition analogy" may gain more support regardless of the Balsys dicta, as extradi-
tion treaties and mutual legal assistance treaties do not appear to be mutually exclusive -
the first provides for extradition from the United States, the second provides for expe-
dited United States assistance in the collection of evidence and information.
The extradition analogy received it strongest criticism by a commentator arguing
from the Supreme Court decision in Neely v. Henkel:1
06
When an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country, he cannot complain if
required to submit to such modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws of that
country may prescribe for its own people, unless a different mode be provided for by
treaty stipulations between that country and the United States. 
107
"Theoretically, the ICC could obtain jurisdiction over a crime committed by an
American, on American soil, against other Americans[,]J " 0 8 and this would supposedly
not fulfill the Neely criterion of international effect. While it is true that a crime on
American soil may draw the ICC's attention, it disregards opinion in the international
community that although an action may be of a domestic nature, its effects may be in-
ternational. For example, NATO action in Kosovo was premised on humanitarian inter-
vention - the offences taking place there were an offence against all humanity. Also, a
number of international conventions and statements create the duty of aut dedere aut
judicare creating universal jurisdiction over the perpetrators of particularly heinous
crimes wherever they may be found. 10 9 The action proscribed by the Rome Statute is of
international concern:
[I]ntemational law permits any state to apply its laws to punish certain offences al-
though the state has no links of territory with the offence, or of nationality with the of-
fender (or even the victim). Universal jurisdiction over the specified offences is a result
of universal condemnation of those activities and general interest in cooperating to
suppress them, as reflected in widely-accepted international agreements and resolutions
of international organisations.11
0
Finally, in any case, the purported complementary jurisdiction of the ICC will pro-
106. 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
107. Id. at 123, quoted in Andreasen, supra note 45, at 729.
108. Andreasen, supra note 45, at 730.
109. See, e.g. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205, art. 5 (1979);
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by U.N. G.A. Res.
54/109 (December 9, 1999).
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 cmt. a
(1987). Section 404 states:
A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offences recognized by
the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hi-
jacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even where
none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated in § 402 is present.
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vide the United States first opportunity to try the case of an American accused of a
crime under the Rome Statute. 11' This trial would presumably take place in the United
States, and would most likely involve a military or jury trial.
2. Contention: The ICC does not provide Americans their constitutional right to a
"speedy trial"
The Protection of United States Troops from Foreign Prosecution Act of 1999,'112
.introduced in the House of Representatives on June 29, 1999, made a claim that has
been removed from later bills of a similar nature, 1 3 but still warrants address, lest any
who read the bill believe its claims to be damning to the Rome Statute. It claimed "a
defendant would face a judicial process almost entirely foreign to the traditions of the
United States and be denied the right to... a speedy trial'
14 [.]" 115
While the Rome Statute does not guarantee defendants a "speedy trial" it does make
provisions to avoid inappropriately lengthy and arduous litigation. The Rome Statute
explicitly states: "The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and
is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protec-
tion of victims and witnesses."' 1 6 Furthermore, the Rome Statute states, "[i]n the deter-
mination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled ... to the following minimum guar-
antees, in full equality: ...to be tried without undue delay."' 1 7 Also, the Pre-Trial
Chamber has the power not only to dismiss a case, for various reasons, but may review
the justifications and length of a defendant's detention before trial."i8 Thus, although the
ICC may lack the terminology of American courts, it will surely have at its disposal a
procedure to protect the right of a "speedy trial."
3. Contention: The ICC does not provide Americans their constitutional right not
to be compelled to provide self-incriminating testimony
While the two most recent bills damning the ICC have wisely declined to criticize
the Rome Statute for lacking the guarantee of a "speedy trial," they do level a new accu-
sation against the constitutionality of the Rome Statue. Both bills, introduced in the
House of Representatives and the Senate on June 14, 2000, claim: "Any American
11. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1).
112. H.R. 2381, 106th Cong. (1999).
113. Whereas H.R. 2381 § 2(3)(B) claims defendants would not be afforded a speedy trial, both H.R.
4654 and S. 2726 lack this assertion.
114. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
115. H.R. 2381 § 2(3)(B).
,116. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 64(2).
117. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 67(l)(c).
118. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 60(4) ("The Pre-Trial Chamber shall ensure that a person is not
detained for an unreasonable period of time prior to trial due to inexcusable delay by the Prosecutor. If such
delay occurs, the Court shall consider releasing the person, with or without conditions.").
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prosecuted by the International Criminal Court will, under the Rome Statute, be denied.
the right not to be compelled to provide self-incriminating testimony."
1 19
The Rome Statute may be vague in some areas, but others areas are fairly difficult
to misconstrue. It quite explicitly states the following: "In respect of an investigation
under this Statute, a person shall not be compelled to incriminate himself or herself or to
confess guilt[.]' 20 Accordingly, the Rome Statute goes on to protect defendants against
coercion, duress or threat; 121 defendants are guaranteed the right to remain silent without
such silence being considered when the Court decides guilt or innocence; 12 2 and, defen-
dants are provided the right of legal assistance, without payment if necessary, 123 and to
be questioned in the presence of counsel, unless the defendant waives such right.' 24 Fi-
nally, in describing the rights of the accused, the Rome Statute states that a defendant
has the right "[n]ot to be compelled to testify or to confess guilt and to remain silent,
without such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or inno-
cence[.]' 125
However, the fears enshrined in the congressional bills referred to above may hold
more weight if it appeared the ICC would deal with coerced confessions very differently
from United States courts. Following a rule established long ago in Brown v. Missis-
sippi,126 and further modified by United States jurisprudence, courts in the United States
will exclude from evidence confessions made in violation of a defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights through either coercion or failure to fulfill the much lauded, and
recently reaffirmed, Miranda requirements. 27 While, for obvious reasons, the ICC has
not yet had reason to deal with this issue directly, it appears that a similar exclusionary
rule may be followed in ICC decisions. Support for this contention is found in the Rome
Treaty itself:
Where the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the [confession is not informed, volun-
tary, and supported by the evidence], it shall consider the admission of guilt as not hav-
ing been made, in which case it shall order that the trial be continued under the ordi-
nary trial procedures provided by this Statute and may remit the case to another Trial
Chamber.
This protection appears not only to remove the involuntary confession from evi-
119. H.R. 4654, 106th Cong. § 2(6) (2000); S. 2726, 106th Cong. § 2(6) (2000).
120. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 55(1)(a).
121. See id. art. 55(1)(b).
122. See id. art. 55(2)(b).
123. See id. art. 55(2)(c).
124. See id. art. 55(2)(d).
125. See id. at art. 67(1)(g).
126. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
127. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (affirming Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)).
128. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 65(3).
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dence, but also attempts to attenuate any effect it may have had on those deciding the
case. As one trial chamber may remit the case to another trial chamber it is possible that
the taint of the involuntary confession will not follow the defendant. This mechanism
may only prove effective if there is a sufficient barrier to transfer of information, either
formally or by rumor, between chambers, but unless the ICC construes this provision in
a very liberal manner it appears to pass United States Fifth Amendment muster.
4. Contention: The ICC does not provide Americans their constitutional right to
confront and cross-examine all witnesses for the prosecution
All three bills introduced in Congress in direct opposition to the Rome Statute claim
that the ICC will not afford defendants the right to confront and cross-examine all wit-
nesses for the prosecution. 129 This statement, claiming a violation of defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights, 130 is true only in so far as it as stated as an absolute. While defen-
dants may not have the opportunity to cross-examine all witnesses against him or her,
they will, pursuant to the Rome Treaty, be entitled to "[e]xamine, or have examined, the
witnesses against him or her and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses
on his or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him or her."'
3 1
Thus, the accused will have an equality of arms with the Prosecutor, except in very
limited circumstances. The section of the Rome Treaty, immediately following that
which describes the rights of the accused, describes the protection of the victims and
witnesses and their participation in the proceedings.
132
While the prosecution and defence will stand on equal statutory grounds regarding
the examination of witnesses these grounds will be subject to a potentially troubling
limitation. Article 64(6)(b) vests in the Trial Chamber of the ICC the power to "[riequire
the attendance and testimony of witnesses and production of documents and other evi-
dence by obtaining, if necessary, the assistance of States as provided in this statute."'
133
Article 93(1) of the Rome Statute, though, appears to take the teeth from this power of
the court by obliging states to facilitate only the voluntary appearance of witnesses or
experts before the court. 134 The Rome Statute does provide a tool to compensate for this
129. See supra notes 114, 118.
130. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the fight... t9 be
confronted with witnesses against him .... ).
131. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 67(l)(e).
132. See id. art. 68(4).
133. Id. at art. 64(6)(b).
134. See id. at art. 93(1)(e). The statute states:
States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and under procedures of
national law, comply with requests by the Court to provide the following assistance in
relation to investigations or prosecutions: ....
(e) Facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons as witnesses or experts before the Court[.]
Id. (emphasis added).
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apparent weakness in the form of the Victims and Witnesses Unit (VWU).135 The VWU
will likely fill two roles: First, "the unit's services will facilitate effective investigation,
prosecution and defence by encouraging them to come forward. Second, the VWU is
essential not to make victims and witnesses unnecessarily suffer twice."' 36 Thus, al-
though witnesses may not be subpoenaed before the ICC in a traditional understanding
of the action, reasonable action will be taken to protect their interests, as well as the
interests of justice.
B. Fears of a Politicized, Litigious ICC
Beyond the (somewhat ambiguous) protection of the doctrine of complementarity,
parties before the ICC will also receive the protection of statutorily mandated judicial
and prosecutorial integrity. Part 4 of the Rome Statute governs the composition and
administration of the ICC. Throughout these provisions the Rome Statute demands that
judges of the ICC be of "high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the
qualifications required in their respective States for appointment to the highest judicial
offices." 137 While the qualifications of judges in the nations that are now signatories the
Rome Statute may vary widely such qualification will nonetheless carry with them a
widely available of public rulings or commentary. Voting parties will thus be able to
critique the impartiality of candidates, as well as assess their qualification in either
criminal law and procedure or international law - the dual alternative substantive quali-
fications of judicial candidates. 3 8
Furthermore, the Rome Statute makes provision for judges to recuse themselves
from cases in which they may have a vested interest, 139 and challenges to a judge's im-
partiality by the Prosecutor or the person being investigated or prosecuted.140 The Prose-
cutor and Deputy Prosecutors of the ICC shall be held to similar standards, and subject
to similar evaluation.1
41
While political reality may rob the provisions of the Rome Statute of some of their
135. See id. at art. 43(6). The statute states:
The Registrar shall set up a Victims and Witnesses Unit within the Registry. This
Unit shall provide, in consultation with the Office of the Prosecutor, protective
measures and security arrangements, counseling and other appropriate assistance
for wit nesses, victims who appear before the Court and others who are at risk on
account of testimony given by such witnesses. The Unit shall include staff with
expertise in trauma, including trauma related to crimes of sexual violence.
Id.
136. Thordis Ingadottir et al., The International Criminal Court: The Victims and Witnesses Unit (Article
43.6) of the Rome Statute), a Discussion Paper, ICC Discussion Paper #1, PICT (PROJECT ON INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS). Available at University of London's Institute of Advanced Legal Study; informa-
tion regarding PICT available at <http://www.pict-pcit.org>.
137. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 36(3)(a).
138. See id. at art. 36(3)(b)(i - ii).
139. See id. at art. 41(1).
140. See id. at art. 41(2)(b).
141. See id. at art. 42.
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effect, any claims that the United States would be a target without friends on the court
would surely be overstated. NATO powers and other developed nations may not form a
majority of nations party to the Rome Statute, 142 and each nation will have only one vote
in electing judges and the prosecutor, but such nations may form a strong enough voting
block to promote a politically neutral court and prosecutor. 143 The United States may not
possess a numerical advantage in the formation of the ICC, but the United States was
successful in achieving some of its goals in the preparatory meetings of the Rome Stat-
ute 144 and may find similar success in the formation of the Court.
V. CONCLUSION
While the ICC and its much criticized complementarity regime may not prove to be
a perfect body, it will function more effectively as now proposed than if the preparatory
committee had accepted the two jurisdictional regimes as proposed by the permanent
five (P-5) members of the Security Council, and independently by the United States.
A. The Flawed P-5 Proposal
The P-5 powers - the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and
China "met intensively to arrive at a compromise package that could be presented to the
conference."'' 45 They "arrived at a joint proposal that would permit a ten-year transi-
tional period following entry into force of the treaty during which any state party could
opt out of the court's jurisdiction over crimes against humanity or war crimes."'' 46 The
P-5 proposal would also reserve the ICC's jurisdiction over non-parties unless the Secu-
rity Council were to decide otherwise. 4 7 The proposal ultimately failed, for good rea-
son. While a ten-year transitional period may woo more nations to sign and ratify the
Rome Statute, it would also severely limit the effectiveness of the court. Not only would
cautious nations, such as the United States, surely take advantage of the opt-out provi-
sion, but also would a number of states with pernicious reason, due to questionable prac-
tices. This would effectively delay the start-up of this much-lauded new era in interna-
tional criminal law for an additional ten years, excepting Security Council intervention.
Security Council intervention, of course, would then furthermore be limited by its politi-
cal nature, and the requirements of the Charter of the United Nations. 1
48
142. See Status of Rome Statute, supra note 2. A number of NATO nations have signed, and some have
already ratified the Rome Statute.
143. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 36(6)(a). Judges will be elected by' a two-thirds majority of the
Assembly of States Parties present and voting by secret ballot.
144. See Scheffer, supra note 30 at 17 ("[Alccomplishments in negotiating the Rome treaty were signifi-
cant.").
145. Id. at 19.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. See supra Section II(B)(2), notes 75,76. The Security Council would need to garner the requisite
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B. The Flawed United States Proposal
"The [United States] delegation [(independent of the P-5 proposal)] also offered a
fresh approach to the court's jurisdiction over any particular crime."'149 The United
States proposal would require, under Article 12 of the Rome Statute, that either both the
territorial state of the crime and the state of the accused approve of the investigation and
prosecution, or to exempt from the ICC's jurisdiction conduct arising from official ac-
tions non-party states if those states should acknowledge the conduct in question as
such. 50 The former of the two proposals would attempt to curb a slide toward universal
jurisdiction by the ICC, and the latter would force states to acknowledge potentially
illegal actions as state sponsored. 15' This latter proposal would enable the United States
to take part in humanitarian interventions, such as that in Kosovo, as official actions and
avoid prosecution of government officials and service members. 5 2 However, while both
proposals are appealing from a United States point of view, it is apparent that the former
would divest the ICC of nearly all jurisdictional scope outside of Security Council inter-
vention, and the latter may allow a demagogue set on crimes against humanity free reign
without Security Council intervention. Thus the flaws of the P-5 proposal reappear in
the United States proposal, and would subject the ICC to the unpredictable, political
workings of the Security Council rather than the unpredictable legal workings of the
ICC. Although trading political uncertainty for legal uncertainty may not prove a wholly
satisfactory answer to United States concerns, at least a legal procedure provides the
participants with greater voice and a wider base of authority from which to act.
53
Although much speculation has been offered regarding the justifications for, and ef-
fectiveness of, an international criminal court, surely no one may claim the clairvoyance
to predict the reception of its first judgment in the realm of international criminal law.
For fear of adding useless conjecture to this debate, this article has attempted a reasoned
explanation of the Rome Statute both in relation to international criminal law, and the
domestic law of the United States. This discussion has demonstrated that the Rome Stat-
ute does contain flaws, yet none so grave as to warrant the skepticism expressed by
many prominent Americans. Rather, the complementarity regime, while imperfect, is
nine votes, acceptance by all five permanent members, and act in the interest of international peace and secu-
rity. Truly domestic offences, although heinous, may not meet this threshold.
149. Scheffer, supra note 30, at 20.
150. See id. (citing UN Doc. A/CONF.183/CI/L.70 (1998), UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.l/L.90 (1998)).
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. Individuals from states without a Security Council presence will be given the opportunity to refute
the court's jurisdiction according to the Rome Statute, and addressing the court itself, rather than through
diplomatic relations with the United Nations. Furthermore, although an international tribunal, such as the
ICC, does not follow the principle of stare decisis found in American jurisprudence, participants will have
access to decisions by former, similar international tribunals such as the ICTY and ICTR. The judgments of
these tribunals may provide guidance in regards to the construction of the Rome Statute itself and the exten-
sion of liability to individuals. Security Council resolutions, although often laden with righteous indignation,
rarely go to such lengths to explain the process behind decisions, or the decisions themselves.
[Vol. 27:2
The Rome Statute
sufficient. Americans will not lose the protection of the Constitution through the exis-
tence of the ICC. And while the United States may have to consider international mili-
tary actions in light of a new international environment, a legally justified decision by
American military leaders and government officials will be demonstrated as such both in
spite of, and because of, an International Criminal Court with United States participa-
tion. Furthermore, the United States can send a message of commitment to the ideals
espoused in the Rome Statute, support for the present and future victims of such crimes,
and conviction to bring the perpetrators of such crimes to justice.
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